Africa—

What Lies Ahead

By

D. K. Chisiza

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AFRICA-what lies ahead

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Malawi Congress Party

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PREFATORY NOTE

This pamphlet sets out to sketch some of the secular and religious problems which the new nations of Africa will have to grapple with. A clear understanding of such problems at this stage of Africa's march to freedom and dignity seems vitally necessary. Not every one of the pertinent problems has been considered. But those that have been considered have been faced squarely. I am under no illusion that the pamphlet provides the answers to the problems under review. My hope is that it will provoke thought and underline the cruciality of the problems.

I am grateful to the Indian Council for Africa for offering to publish the pamphlet. To Mr. Dinesh Singh, M.P., Secretary-General of the Council and Member of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations, and Mr. B. S. Krishnamurthy, the Council's Office Secretary, I owe special thanks. Not only did these two men provide me with cosmopolitan companionship during my sojourn in New Delhi, but also they enabled me, through their own activities, to gain an insight into the mind of young India. Their understanding, versatility, efficiency and ability to get things done revealed in their efforts to get this pamphlet published in two weeks time impressed me considerably. Lastly, I want to thank and congratulate the printers, Messrs. Kapoor Art Press, for managing to get the pamphlet printed within the time limit of the publishers.

Dunduzu K. Chisiza

Malawi Congress Party H.Q.,
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1. SECULAR PROBLEMS

The question is often asked : After independence, what ? And some answer : "African nationalists believe that bliss and an end to their problems will automatically follow." That is the belief not of African nationalists but of people who have taken it upon themselves to interpret African feelings. Few, if any, African leaders view the advent of independence in that way. Most of them are aware that independence does three things : (a) it throws into sharp relief basic economic and social problems hitherto eclipsed by the overriding problem of foreign domination, and (b) it creates its own problems, but (c) it also gives the new rulers power with which to tackle the problems. However, to recognise that the future of free Africa is fraught with problems is one thing ; to have a clear idea of what those problems are likely to be is quite another matter. The purpose of the present chapter is to outline what, in the opinion of the writer, are likely to be the most crucial of those problems. The problems will be considered under four main heads:

(a) Political problems,

(b) Leadership problems,

(c) Social problems, and

(d) Economic problems.

Political Problems

Under this head there are five problems with which the emerging African States will have to contend. The first of these is that of the relationship between government and opposition. As things stand at the moment, the relationship is unhealthy in some of the countries. This unhealthiness is indicated by such symptoms as intolerance on the part of governing parties towards opposition parties, a tendency towards "strongman" governments, indulgence in smear campaigns and political instability.

It can be argued, on the one hand, that the intolerance of governing parties is bred by the "destructive criticism" of opposition parties and that the tasks which these new countries face call for "strongman" governments. On the other hand, it can equally be contended that the attitude of opposition parties is the inevitable reaction to the intolerance of governing parties and that political unrest results from the conviction of opposition parties that the speeches of their parliamentary representatives, in and outside parliament, will not influence governing parties to change some of their policies. There is some element of truth in both arguments but the remainder of the truth lies elsewhere.

The main explanation for the friction hinges on the sharing of gratitude and prestige. Before independence, foreign rulers occupy the topmost rungs of the social ladder. With the coming of independence, however, they step down and leaders of parties which have triumphed at the polls step up to fill the vacant rungs, thereby becoming the recipients of gratitude and admiration from their fellow-countrymen for having liberated their countries. Leaders of opposition parties who may have fought for independence just as valiantly as anyone else find themselves the recipients of practically nothing. Herein lies the rub. It is only human for these people to feel that they have been given a raw deal. Once they begin to feel that way, they are often certain to despise and to denounce their opponents as "selfish, ambitious, vain..." Their opponents will regard this as mischievous detraction and may retort by calling them "jealous, visionless, little men with small minds." And so the stage is set for full-scale mudslinging which sometimes culminates in the governing party clamping down on their opponents with the force of law.

But this kind of measure does not solve the problem ; it only exasperates feelings, creates more tension and leads to political strife. Yet the economic and social problems which confront new countries require, for their solution, that there should be unity, stability and co-operation between government and opposition. And since the first ten to

fifteen years of independence are the most decisive in economic modernisation, it is imperative that unity, stability and co-operation should be forthcoming soon after independence. How can these requirements be achieved?

The problem we are facing here is how to make it possible for leaders of popular opposition parties to share in the gratitude and admiration which the masses lavish on their rivals in the early years of independence. For this there seems to be no better idea than that during the first ten years or so there should be "national" governments—the type of all-party government that Britain had during the world war. After all, most of the countries are at war—with poverty, ignorance, malnutrition and disease. Whether they win the war will depend, to a very large extent, on the co-operation and the enthusiasm which the leaders can generate among themselves and among their fellow-countrymen. Party wrangles resulting in mutual hatred, disunity, confusion and despondency are not an asset in such a war or any war for that matter.

The formation of a national government would have another salutary effect: it would stay away the "dictatorship of the party" and preclude the unsettling effects of frequent elections brought about by the defeat of governments on motions of censure. The convention that the governing party should go to the polls if it is defeated on a motion of censure and the concomitant insistence of the party machine that members should support the party line, whether they agree with it or not, in order to avoid defeat, are two monstrosities which require drastic modification if they are to be imported into Africa.

It is realised that the formation of national governments would eliminate the critical element in parliamentary debates. But this elimination can be regretted only if criticism serves a useful purpose. It is highly doubtful that the criticism of opposition parties in Africa serves such a purpose. In Western countries the function of the opposition is to compel thought, to expose some of the dangers of the policies of the government and to exhort the government to change those policies

which are dangerous. And the function is apparently a useful one in those countries. But in Africa few oppositions can claim the achievement of either compelling thought or persuading governments to change some of their policies.

Far from suggesting that Africans have not grasped the essentials of party democracy, this only means that governments do not yet trust the intentions of oppositions, either because the latter once co-operated with the "enemies of freedom" or because leaders of rival parties have not had the opportunity of knowing and trusting each other. Since opposition, in the initial years of independence, achieves few positive results, and since it frays nerves on both sides, there seems to be a strong case on this score alone for inviting leaders of popular[1] opposition parties to participate in government. Working together in this way would have the effect of building up mutual trust between the leaders of various parties. Once distrust has been removed, the winning and losing parties can revert to their respective functions of proposing and opposing and there would be a reasonable chance that the views of the opposition will not only be listened to sympathetically but also acted upon where necessary.

Undoubtedly, it is not pleasant to work side by side with your rival. Leaders of the main political parties in Britain also felt that way on the eve of the second world war. But they saw that the situation demanded unity and co-operation so they curbed their rivalry and teamed up together to save their Fatherland. In Africa, the leaders face the challenge of saving their countries from stagnation. Have they anything to lose by teaming together?

The second political problem relates to the choice of the path to be trodden by new States after independence. Professor W.W. Rostow says[2] that the coalitions of nationalist leaders who bring about independence in colonial territories are usually made up of four elements: soldiers, professional politicians,

1. If the opposition is not popular with only a handful of representatives in parliament it would not be necessary to form a national government.
2. In the "Stages of Economic Growth."

merchants and intellectuals. "Once modern nationhood is established, different elements in the coalition press to mobilise the newly triumphant nationalist .. sentiment in different directions. The soldiers say abroad ; the professional politicians, to drive home the triumph of the centre over the region; the merchants, to economic development; the intellectuals, to social, political and legal reform."

The question thus arises : Shall the meagre resources of the new states be used for waging war on neighbouring states, for subduing the traditional rulers, for economic development, or for meeting the expenses of social, political and legal reform? Better still, what line of action should receive emphasis? Professor Rostow believes that much depends on "the balance of power within the coalition". If the merchant element is in ascendancy, we can expect that economic modernisation will receive priority. On the other hand, if soldiers are the dominant element, we should expect clashes with neighbouring states.

This is an observation of first-rate importance by an expert who has spent many years studying the process of economic growth. Among those who believe that the energies of new states should be directed towards economic development, the temptation will be great to draw the conclusion that the rulers of new states should be drawn from the merchant class. Such an inference would be unfortunate for a number of reasons. First, in some countries the coalition of new rulers may not have a merchant element. Secondly, some of the merchant elements are more interested in furthering their own private business ends than in national economic development. And, thirdly, in other countries the merchant element has not got a chance of becoming the leading element of the coalition. The strategy which Professor Rostow's important observation suggests is not so much that reliance should be placed on any one element as that the dominant element should be sold on the need to concentrate on the task of economic modernisation.

In this selling job, Western leaders can do a great deal to

influence the attitude of African leaders. This is possible because there is a tendency among African leaders to "compete for pre-eminence" and to "seek the appreciation of Western leaders". This tendency can be exploited to very good advantage. Western leaders can make it clear to African leaders that while in non-self-governing countries the leader who is admired is the one who struggles for the liberation of his country, in independent countries the leader who wins the respect of Western nations is the one who is bent on reform and economic modernisation.

But the people who are most likely to succeed in selling African leaders on the necessity of according priority to modernisation are men from among the ranks of the African leaders themselves. Some of the leaders are already sold on modernisation. These leaders should be given facilities for communicating their convictions to their counter-parts in other countries. One of the best ways of doing so would be for the United Nations Economic and Social Council to convene yearly conferences on reform and economic modernisation to be attended by only the top leaders of the various countries and a few experts. The object of the conference would be not to discuss technical problems but to enable the leaders to compare notes, to develop interest in the thrilling work of modernisation, to infect each other with enthusiasm for economic development, to raise and broaden their horizons, and to sight possible milestones in the path of modernisation. To maintain the interest of the leaders between the conferences, a magazine—devoted to the description of achievements in various countries, the definition of current development problems and the suggestion of possible lines of development—could be produced and circulated among the leaders.

Undoubtedly, there are other methods of selling African leaders on modernisation apart from "leaders' conferences", "leaders' magazine", and the appreciation of those leaders who lay emphasis on modernisation. These are suggested here merely to indicate the sort of approach which is required.

The third problem is that of political regrouping. There

is concern among African leaders over the "balkanisation" of many regions of Africa, and a desire to see some of the countries regrouped into larger units. Where it can be done without friction, where it can be established that it would be economically advantageous to *all* the countries concerned, there is everything to be said for geo-political regrouping. But where such a move raises suspicions, gets hearts thumping or strains relations, the idea is better shelved until time is opportune.

The fact must be faced that the carving up of the continent into territories with different names, the establishment of central governments and the nationalist activities of recent years have all combined to din it into the minds of the Africans of each territory that they are a people apart, that they form, in fact, a separate nation. This belief, this nationalism, is an asset for the purpose of liberation. But for the purpose of regrouping countries, it is a liability in the same way that tribalism is a liability in the task of unifying tribes, localities and areas into a single nation. Tribalism cannot support the edifice of national government. So we set about fostering national consciousness before setting up popularly elected national governments. By the same token, nationalism cannot support the superstructure of regional government. The basis of regional government is regional consciousness. So those who would regroup countries must first address themselves to the problem of encouraging a regional outlook among their countrymen. So far, infinitesimally little has been done in this direction. On the other hand, there is a lot of activity on the "Pan-African" level. It is not clear whether the belief is that by fostering a Pan-African spirit the foundation for regional political federations is being laid. If this is so, some rethinking is urgently required here.

Pan-Africanism, as a strategy for emancipation, is unquestionably effective. But as a unifying agent for regional co-operation it is far too superficial and an operation roof-top. We must build from down upwards not from up downwards ; and there must be a knitting of the fabric of the regions, not

just a basting of it. All this can be summed up by saying that the political development of Africa must proceed by stages. This is not counsel for gradualism (there is room for any thing but gradualism in Africa) but counsel for realism. Ideas about 'stages' vary with writers not only in politics but also in other disciplines such as economics. The writer suggests the following :

1. Attainment of independence,
2. Vigorous modernisation of economies,
3. Encouragement of regional economic co-operation and regional consciousness,
4. Political regrouping of neighbouring countries.

The fourth problem is that of completing the annihilation of tribalism and parochialism (hereinafter referred to as tribo-parochialism). The problems which tribo-parochialism creates after independence are a bit different from those which it creates before independence. But they are equally formidable. By the time independence is attained, the influence of crude tribo-parochialism will have been mitigated. There will, however, still be some ugly traces of it. This lingering tribo-parochialism can play havoc which is out of all proportion to its intensity. In an independent country, it can breed mistrust, promote disunity, give rise to internal political strife, be inimical to labour and social mobility, hamper economic development, engender nepotism among leaders, condone partiality and result in official corruption. In the interest of stability and orderly development, everything must be done to remove the last vestiges of this canker. Smug complacency resulting from the delusion that once colonialism has been turned out of doors the house is automatically in order will be dangerous here. The house is, in fact, strewn with the sad heritage of colonialism and African leaders must ever strive to put things in order.

Ways of eradicating tribo-parochialism include: (a) intensification of the nationalist sentiment ; (b) organisation of all-state cultural, social and political activities to encourage national consciousness ; (c) construction of a good internal

transport system to encourage mass travel ; (d) exchange of students between regional or provincial schools ; (e) posting locally recruited civil servants to provinces other than their own ; and (f) maintenance of an efficient network of media of mass communication, *i.e.* production of popular newspapers, operation of an up-to-date broadcasting system and provision of a good national film service, all of which encourage people to look to the Centre and to think in terms of the nation as a whole.

The fifth and last problem under this head concerns chiefs or traditional rulers. In some countries, traditional rulers wield a lot of influence among the masses. This is just another way of saying that the masses are more loyal to their tribal rulers than to their national rulers—for lasting sway can be exercised over a people only with their willing consent. But traditional rule is based on tribalism. Loyalty to a traditional ruler, therefore, means loyalty to the tribe and implies the practice of tribalism. This is in direct conflict with the central government policy of shaking the various tribes into one solid nation.

What is wrong here is not that traditional rulers are deliberately undermining the influence of the central government but that the "colonial central government" had done little to make its influence felt either because it pushed the policy of indirect rule too far or because it was suppressing the emergence of nationalist leaders and the nationalist sentiment by over-boosting the prestige of traditional rulers.

Whatever the cause of the conflict, however, something must be done to stop, where it exists, the tug-of-war between central and local rulers. The way to do so is certainly not by getting rid of traditional rule ; that would only precipitate chaos. For the foreseeable future, traditional rule will be an indispensable encumbrance which African leaders must be willing to put up with. It is one of the traditional institutions which are the repositories of indigenous techniques against whose background the exotic techniques must be adapted to suit local genius. The point to bear in mind in tackling this

problem is that loyalty to traditional rulers is just another facet of tribo-parochialism. It follows from this that measures taken to combat tribo-parochialism will also counteract excessive loyalty to traditional rulers. But more direct measures must be taken. The Central Government must take steps to make its influence felt among the masses. This will necessitate taking over some of the vital functions performed by the administrations of traditional rulers and launching publicity campaigns to remind people about what the central government is doing for them.

Leadership Problems

In January, 1960, Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld, Secretary General of the United Nations, toured twenty-four countries in Africa and met "most of the national African leaders". Of these leaders he had this to say when he returned to New York : "I found the present generation of African leaders to be of high seriousness, devotion and intelligence. I am sure in their hands those countries will go to a happy future." Those who have first-hand knowledge of the present crop of African leaders will probably agree that that is an accurate assessment. The tribulations through which Africa has come, the humiliations to which her sons and daughters have been subjected over the years, and the poverty which is hitting her people throughout the continent cannot but produce leaders who are dedicated to the proposition that from now onwards the lot of their people shall be significantly improved. The cause to which these leaders are consecrating themselves is noble, their trust is sacred, their problems manifold, their tasks immense. Accordingly, they must be on the look-out against pitfalls which might sabotage their work and plunge their countries into chaos. There are seven main dangers against which they have to guard.

The first of these refers to the policy of "rewarding friends and punishing foes". When independence has been won, leaders of governing parties are understandably anxious to prove to their followers that steadfastness in the national struggle does pay by bestowing favours in the shape of jobs

on those of their followers who were loyal to "the cause of freedom". No realist would quarrel with such gestures. In countries where the government is also the main employer, it would be inhuman for the leaders to leave in the lurch those who toiled and sacrificed all they had for national liberation. What is deplorable is for leaders to go to the extreme of leap-frogging suitably qualified non-party people in favour of un-qualified party supporters to fill posts which require technical skill. To pursue such a policy would be not only to drive countries into disastrous bogs of inefficiency but also to set dangerous precedents which might culminate in the corrupt system of "spoils". Let unemployed "ex-soldiers of freedom" get a fair proportion of the available jobs, by all means. But where skill is called for, proper qualifications rather than loyalty should be the criterion.

As for "punishing foes", there are two aspects of it: revenge against past "enemies" and victimisation of present "foes". Revenge against pre-independence "enemies" is ignoble and unworthy of the leadership of a governing party. The freedom which the ruling leaders fought for was not meant only for their immediate followers but for all—including thieves, prostitutes, murderers, and "those misguided quislings who do not know what is in their interest". Victimisation of present foes raises moral issues which can have very disturbing effects. A distinction must be very clearly drawn between enemies of the state and enemies of one's party. Confirmed enemies of the state, all would agree, must be dealt with in accordance with the law of the land. But dealing with rival parties is a tricky business which, if mishandled, can cause political leaders (on both sides) much unnecessary suffering. Vindictiveness directed at the opposition parties has its nemesis when tables are turned—not to mention the adverse effects of resultant strife on economic development. The verdict seems inescapable that, all things considered, a policy of "rewarding friends and punishing foes" will do far much more harm than good.

An allied danger to the foregoing is that of nepotism. Here

again we are confronted with favouritism but this time the emphasis of the leaders is on their relatives rather than on their party supporters. In this case, uncles, brothers, nephews, cousins, and in-laws are preferred above others in the allocation of offices, not because they are better qualified than other candidates but because they happen to be the relatives of the leaders. This kind of discrimination is just as offensive and iniquitous as colour discrimination. It results in the waste and misallocation of a scarce resource—trained men ; it stifles the emergence of efficient business as well as administrative executives, it encourages people not to seek knowledge or training but to trace up their relationship with the leaders, and above all it may lead some hard-hit men into the tragic belief that they can remedy the situation only by assassinating and replacing current leaders with their own kith and kin.

Fortunately, the chances of nepotism laying its hold on the present generation of African leaders seem remote. Still, in view of the fact that when nepotism comes, it does not do so with fanfare, African leaders must be constantly on their guard against it.

The third danger assumes the form of blurred vision. It has been said that "where there is no vision people perish". This holds true for almost every country but it is even more so for underdeveloped countries. Blurred vision of what things should be results from the failure of nationalist leaders after the attainment of independence to switch from their role of freedom-fighters to that of economic modernisers. But it is an understandable failure. It is not very easy to change from the former role to the latter any more than it is easy to change from carpentry to agriculture. A man who has spent years fighting for the freedom of his country acquires techniques and develops a fighting complex which are of little use in the task of modernisation. Those leaders who succeed in adjusting themselves to their new tasks are the ones who never lost sight of the fact that freedom is merely a means to the end of social and economic reorganisation and who consequently punctuated their fight for freedom with reflections on the measures that

would be required to effect the reorganisation.

The main symptom of blurred vision is the tendency of the leaders concerned to bury themselves in routine work to which colonial administrators of pre-independence days had lashed themselves. Such a tendency turns the group of leaders into a mere 'dominant minority' lacking creativeness, initiative and drive. But leaders of under-developed countries cannot afford to wallow in routine work. They must initiate development schemes which will raise the levels of living of their peoples, thereby exhibiting the blessings of freedom. People must see new things happening and feel that there is a change, otherwise disillusionment will set in. To do these things, leaders must have clear vision, a clear picture of the new state of affairs that must be brought about.

There are two ways of acquiring such a vision : delving in literature which deals with development problems and consulting economic and social experts as to what should be done. Both are essential. It is not enough for leaders to have experts around to advise them on technical details; they themselves must have a fairly good idea of (a) the problems involved, (b) the possible solutions, (c) the economic potential and limitations of their countries, and (d) what other leaders in similar situations have done, are doing and propose to do. Only when they have such an overall picture will they take interest in development work, be in a position to accept or reject intelligently the advice of experts and disentangle themselves from the shackles of routine work.

The fourth danger stems directly from the danger just considered. It relates to two closely linked things : (a) dwelling in the past, and (b) petty jealousies. Leaders who get lost in the details of routine operations have little to show in the way of concrete achievements and so the temptation to rake up and extol the past glories of their countries becomes irresistible. But past glory is no substitute for contemporary glory. Leaders of new countries can ill-afford to dwell in the past. Their concern is with the future. Some inspiration can be drawn from past achievements, of course, but

the main inspiration for the leaders as well as the masses will have to be drawn from current achievements.

When leaders are apparently doing and achieving nothing remarkable, people tend to regard leadership as merely a means to personal enrichment and prestige. This view leads to the bedevilment of intrigue, petty jealousies and personality clashes among leaders of the same party or the same country. It is significant that where leaders are bent double on the task of development, petty jealousies among them are almost non-existent.

The fifth danger lies in the competition of African leaders for pre-eminence. There are two facets of this competition: (a) several leaders may each try to be a cut above the others by posing as the 'big' brothers of other African nations, and (b) several leaders may each try to impress the outside world more than the others. As more and more territories in Africa become free, there will be some leaders who will try to bring some of the countries under the economic wings of their countries. Some may do so because they sincerely believe that their countries are economically better off than the countries of their brethren and that it is therefore their moral duty to help them. Others may do so because they secretly hope that in so doing they will eclipse other leaders and be looked upon as leaders not only of their own countries but also of the countries they help. Yet others may do so with the intention of boosting up the prestige of their countries.

Help which is given in the true African spirit of 'mutual aid' will unmistakably be known for what it is and will not be resented by the people of the receiving country. But aid motivated by personal ambition and untempered nationalism will succeed only in sowing the seeds of mistrust, hatred and strife. No self-respecting leader, with enough guts and stamina to have wrested his country from the horrors of colonialism, will want to play second fiddle to an African power maniac or to see his country dance to the tune of another. It is to be sincerely hoped that those leaders who believe in

cooperating on an equal footing and helping one another without ulterior motives will not hesitate to spurn and ostracise leaders who show signs of being motivated by mean ambitions thereby avoiding getting involved in wrangles which might make nonsense of all that Africa has suffered and struggled for for so long.

Those leaders who vie with each other in an endeavour to impress and convince the outside world that they are the greatest, the "real force" among African leaders indulge in a game which has a built-in tendency to degenerate into a vulgar competition, to deteriorate into personality clashes, and eventually to burst into open hostility. This kind of competition provides effective ammunition to those people who would like to set African leaders against one another and see the solidarity of the new Africa broken up. It is an unnecessary competition which deserves the condemnation of those people who want to foster African unity and to promote harmonious co-operation. It is unnecessary because if there is any leader who is an undiscovered genius, he can be quite certain that the world will spot him in good time even if he does not advertise himself. If he does not happen to be a genius, no amount of self-advertisement to the contrary will dupe the world into believing that he is one. Indeed, a man who finds it necessary to proclaim his greatness is the one who knows he is not great, otherwise he would not even think of the idea. Really great people are far too busy performing great deeds to think of strutting around impressing people with their greatness.

The sixth danger relates to the policy of aligning with power blocs. It has been argued by some African leaders that it is mean to sit on the fence and enjoy the best of both worlds. According to these leaders, Africans must take sides somehow. A good many Western nations would endorse this view wholeheartedly. Some of the nations seem to hold the view that "those who are not for us are against us," and are therefore anxious to separate friends from foes. But in this case a policy of alignment defeats its own purpose :

that of keeping communism out of emerging states.

It is almost a universal tendency in the less developed regions of the world that if the ruling party is pro-West, the opposition will be pro-East. It is true that the pro-East outlook is also to be found in countries where a policy of non-alignment has been adopted. But the non-alignment policy of ruling parties, in these countries, takes so much wind out of the sails of their opponents that for all practical purposes the would-be Communists are nothing more than impotent minorities. Some people believe that a policy of alignment with the West can also keep out communism provided the leaders make up their minds to be tough with people who have communist leanings. Maybe it can ; but communism has a reputation for thriving on persecution. The policy of aligning with the West creates a burning issue for communists and so long as they have a legitimate issue to fight, "firmness", persecution, only add fuel to the flame. Paradoxical as it may sound, the safest way of aligning with the West is not to align with the West.

The seventh danger is that of dictatorship. Three things will bring about a dictatorship in Africa : (1) too much trust ; (2) too little trust, and (3) neurotic ambition. Of the three causes, the third presents the least problem. A man who makes up his mind to be another Napoleon, Hitler or Mussolini, in these changed times, can be certain that resurgent Africa will deal with him the way Europe dealt with the above-mentioned misanthropes. People cannot heave off the yoke of colonialism and then fail to pulverise under their feet a demented individual who wants to sit on their necks.

The real problem is posed by those leaders who will lapse into dictatorial tendencies either because their countrymen trust them too much or too little. When too much trust is reposed in a leader (sometimes) the thing goes to his head and makes him believe that he is infallible. Such a man is not likely to brook criticism or to welcome alternative suggestions. It is his idea or nothing. On the other hand, when a brilliant,

self-assured, well-meaning leader is begrudged trust or is dealing with a dense populace, he too will tend to force his measures through in a dictatorial manner believing that the masses will appreciate what he is doing later.

Both of these leaders need a dose of humility They need to remind themselves that getting to the top of the political tree does not necessarily mean that they are more intelligent than other people. Indeed politics, the world over, has the uncanny knack of attracting the most mediocre of brains. There are people in the population of each country who, intellectually, are by far the superior of political leaders. In framing policies and designing measures, therefore, leaders must rely on public opinion and the opinions of colleagues than on their imagined superior intellects. The task of leadership involves leading as well as following.

Social Problems

Under this head we consider seven problems. But it should be pointed out, once again, that the purpose of this chapter is not to paint the entire landscape of the political, social and economic problems which new African states are likely to face but merely to sketch the peaks of the problems which can be expected to be the most intractable from the point of view of the Africans themselves.

One of the trickiest problems for new countries is that of picking out customs and traditions which must be discarded and selecting those foreign culture patterns which must be adopted. Western economic and social experts invariably point out in their studies of development problems that there are, on the one hand, indigenous customs which are inimical to economic development and, on the other, foreign practices which are highly conducive to economic progress. They advise that the former should be eliminated and the latter adopted if a break with stagnation is to be made.

Among the things they deplore in indigenous cultures are : superstition: nepotism; the vertical family system; the "servile" status of women ; lack of social mobility; shared inheritance

of prejudice against certain occupations such as trading, money-lending etc.; fatalism manifesting itself in the acceptance of one's lot as a decree from heaven; some religious beliefs which are incompatible with modernisation efforts; segregation based on caste, class, colour, tribe, region or religion; multiplicity of languages; absence of individualism; communal ownership of land; high birth rate; landlordism; scattered land holdings; lack of response to wage incentives; the prevalence of absenteeism among industrial workers; high labour turnover; the hoarding of such money as is saved; indisposition to save; and preference for investment in real estate among the few that do some investing.

They recommend the introduction of opposite practices : rationality; universalism; horizontal family structure; sex equality; vertical social mobility; the system of primogeniture; the removal of occupational prejudice; instilling the belief that man can control his environment; inculcation of those protestant ethics which are conducive to the accumulation of capital; the eradication of segregative tendencies in all their manifestations; the introduction of a common language; the practice of individualism; curbing the birth rate; promotion of a sense of equality; individual ownership of land; consolidation of land holdings; exposing the masses to the money economy; checking absenteeism; stabilization of the industrial worker; taking measures which will induce hoarders to invest their money in productive enterprises; fostering the saving habit; and persuading those that do invest to invest in businesses other than real estate.

On the face of it most of these are good, logical recommendations. But a few moments' reflection will show that not all of them are as good as they appear to be. Some are easier said than done. Others would take a very long time to implement. Yet others would greatly endanger the psychological welfare of the indigenous masses. And a few are dangerously tricky. To illustrate: it is not an easy matter to introduce the horizontal family system where it does not exist; the adoption of a common language by the masses is

not something that can come about overnight; the encouragement of individualism among people who derive their sense of security from "mutual aid" would result in a terrible sense of insecurity, while the introduction of effective methods of birth-control among people whose sex morality is based on the fear of giving birth to illegitimate children would easily result in such promiscuity as would rock the foundation of the marriage institution.

To say so is not to "pass a vote of no confidence" in the recommendations but to call upon the leaders of the new countries to have presence of mind in the implementation of the recommendations. It should be their duty to look at the recommendations from the angle of their people and to select those (1) which show signs of being the most practical; (2) which will not take too long to implement; (3) which have less unfavourable effects on the psychological welfare of the people; and (4) which will not raise new problems. Indeed the experts who make these recommendations are themselves becoming increasingly aware of the possible ill-effects which might flow from some of them, and are doing their utmost to suggest only those measures which will do the least harm. But it is not enough that well-meaning foreign experts should vicariously project themselves into the lives of Africans and feel the possible dangers of some of their recommendations. The views of the Africans themselves should be brought to bear in the selection of implementable recommendations.

Another problem which warrants attention is that of throwing up new groups of social leaders. Almost every society has some semblance of an informal group of people who set social standards. These people are not necessarily also political leaders. More often than not, they are leaders in other spheres of life such as business, cultural activities and religious affairs. They have one thing in common; they initiate necessary changes and/or safeguard the best of a society's traditions. Africans had their own social leaders who were supplanted by foreign social leaders after the conti-

nent had been subjugated. Subtly, slowly, foreigners taught Africans to despise their own way of life, to appreciate the European way of life; to judge the appropriateness of most of the things they did by European standards and to follow the leadership of Europeans in social matters.

But the advent of independence curbs the influence of European social leaders almost to nil. The downfall of European political leadership seems to go hand in hand with the downfall of European social leadership. Thus, independence creates a social vacuum: the country concerned is left without established social leadership. Europeans cease to be effective social leaders while traditional social leaders cannot be drafted in to fill the vacuum. Things will have changed so much during the period of foreign rule that traditional social leaders would be ill-fitted to play their role in the changed environment. It is this vacuum which constitutes the problem we are considering.

The African elite who are the masters of the new situation must provide the social leadership required to fill the vacuum. If such leadership is not forthcoming, the masses will have no alternative but to clutch at the flotsam and jetsam of foreign ways and thus build up a fluid and an unintegrated cultural content in the new country. The task of the new social leaders should be to steer the new countries away from the tragedy of wholesale imitation of foreign ways and from the blunder of returning to the traditional ways. Obviously, this calls for men of conviction who know their African as well as their European ways thoroughly and who are at once patriotic, progressive and balanced. They need not be accorded official status but they should be identified, given due recognition and aided in exerting their influence over the masses.

Standardised tastes or social conformity is yet another problem which some of the new countries will face. The main causes of this problem are: (a) the existence of an extremely popular political leadership whose tastes and mannerisms are imitated down the social scale; (b) the domination of a tiny

but influential social leadership; (c) the indiscriminate imitation of foreign ways; (d) a compact population in which views, news and fashions diffuse rapidly; and (e) the existence of an efficient transportation system and a tolerably up-to-date network of media of mass communication.

The danger of social conformity is that it encourages intellectual conformity so that if the tiny band of men who do the thinking initiate change, start new styles etc. make a mistake in one thing or another, the mistake will be imitated by the entire population. Furthermore, if the men cease to think creatively, to innovate and to initiate social change, the consequent disaster would affect not just a few individuals but the whole nation. Social conformity has its advantages, of course, but these are out-weighed by the disadvantages.

To keep social conformity at its minimum, political leaders must refrain from playing the double role of political as well as social leaders. Social leadership should be the responsibility of different people who should be given due recognition and encouragement by the political leaders. But the base of social leadership should be so broadened as to accommodate a variety of tastes and ideas thereby preventing the popularization of a few pet ideas originated by a handful of people. Lastly, it should be made clear to social leaders that their job is not to throw overboard everything African nor merely to process foreign ways but to uphold African ways of life where necessary, to adopt foreign ways where possible and to strike practicable compromises where need be.

The fourth problem concerns women. The new governments must help African women to adjust themselves to their new role in the cash economy. In a subsistence economy the duties of a housewife are: (a) to bear children; (b) to rear them; (c) to draw water; (d) to fetch firewood; (e) to cook; (f) to entertain female guests; (g) to care for the relatives of her husband; and (h) to do light work in the fields. But in the money economies which are springing up in almost every

country semi-westernised Africans expect their wives to perform different functions. Modern African young men want their wives (a) to know how to prepare traditional as well as western dishes ; (b) to know how to rear childern in the modern way ; (c) to share in their social interests such as dancing, etc. ; (d) to maintain a modern home which they can be proud of ; (e) to be able to entertain guests both the African and the western way depending upon the type of guests ; (f) to know enough English to be able to read useful manuals and to converse in English when necessary ; (g) to master the art of washing and ironing clothes, and (h) to know how to dress like film stars without playing the part.

But women who can do these things form an infinitesimal proportion of the African female population. A few of them have done schooling of some sort; but the majority have not even seen the inside of a school. The new governments cannot ignore these adults and concentrate on training young girls. Adult education classes organised under the auspices of something akin to the Danish Folk High Schools must be conducted to introduce housewives to the modern way of life and to give them useful ideas about the management of a modern home. Alternatively, these classes could be included in a national community development programme which could be designed to provide, in addition, instruction for men also.

Economic Problems

Economic problems in this context relate mainly to the following : (1) choice of the economic system on which development is to be patterned, (2) the determination of basic objectives of economic policy, (3) the creation of political federations-cum-economic unions, (4) the neglect of rural areas, (5) the stabilization of industrial labour, (6) the clash between trade union and economic development objectives, and (7) the necessity of guiding change in consumption patterns.

1. In one way or another, leaders of new countries are invited by people in the West to make known their views : are they for or against communism? While it is important

that leaders should be quite clear as to what kind of system they are adopting, it is both unnecessary and objectionable to narrow the range of choice to two systems: capitalism and communism. As a matter of fact, the chances of either of these systems being adopted in its unadulterated form are very slim. In Africa, the tendency is towards a *pragmatic* approach which discards the irrelevant and incorporates the best from both systems. This approach has much to commend itself in countries where economic institutions are still in their formative years.

2. What should be the basic economic objectives of economic policy under a *Pragmatic Pattern of Development?* They are manifold, but the following are probably the most important:

(a) Raising living standards so that the majority of people can enjoy a better intellectual and cultural life.

(b) Multiplication of economic opportunities so as to minimize under-employment.

(c) Promotion of entrepreneurial activities among the less privileged sections of the community.

(d) Reduction of inequalities in incomes, wealth and economic power.

(e) Calculation of the benefits of new economic activities not so much in terms of monetary profit as in terms of social gain.

(f) Enforcement of better conditions of work and the principle of equal pay for equal work for both Africans and non-Africans, men as well as women.

(g) Maintenance of stable prices.

(h) Provision of some measure of social security for those of the aged, infirm and disabled who have no one to depend upon.

(i) Promotion of a sense of purpose and participation among the masses.

(j) Encouragement of a sense of fellowship and belonging among the races.

Each one of these objectives calls for certain measures for its achievement. Raising living standards in effect means raising the incomes of those people who are already in employment and bringing the unemployed under paid employment. These in turn mean building a modern economic infrastructure, modernizing agriculture, industrializing the economy and developing mineral resources.

Multiplication of economic opportunities in the early stages of development calls for the commercialization of agriculture on a massive scale ; the provision of paid employment to rural populations during the off-seasons ; the promotion of small-scale and handicraft industries; and the pursuance of a policy of balanced regional development.

Promotion of entrepreneurial activities among the less privileged sections of the community entails imparting technical and managerial know-how to the would-be- entrepreneurs ; provision of capital and assistance in the recruitment of labour and the assembly of raw materials ; reducing risks and the supply of reliable economic data.

Reduction of inequalities in incomes, wealth and economic power requires various measures. Inequalities in incomes can be reduced by fiscal measures to level off (without reducing the incentive to work and save) the incomes of those persons who are at the upper end of the income scale and economic development efforts designed to increase the income of those persons who are at the lower end of the scale. Disparities in wealth and economic power can be reduced by death duties ; the co-operative form of ownership ; and public ownership of monopolies and key industries.

Social gain as a criterion of economic activities implies that government should allocate development resources not only to those enterprises which are likely to yield monetary profit, but also for those activities which are essential to the

welfare of the people even if they are *not* likely to yield monetary gain. An example of such activities is the provision of social and health services. Further, this principle would dictate that if in addition to employing a considerable number of people an enterprise can barely pay its way through, it should be undertaken without hesitation. The gain in such a case is not in the form of profits but in the shape of incomes to the employees who would be that worse off if they were unemployed or under-employed.

Enforcement of equitable conditions of work involves passing humane factory laws; strengthening the trade union movement by appropriate legislation (without prejudicing economic development objectives); requiring employers to provide better living conditions for their employees; legislating against industrial colour-bar; and enforcing the principle of "equal pay for equal work" for all regardless of race or sex.

Maintenance of stable prices demands that government should take the necessary measures to prevent and to check inflationary as well as deflationary pressures so that the rise in the real incomes of the people is not swallowed up in rising prices or lost in the chaos of depressions.

Social security in an underdeveloped economy is something very close to a luxury. Scarcely any of the advanced countries ever provided it in the early stages of development. None could have afforded it without arresting capital formation. The same would seem to go for present-day underdeveloped countries. But there is a difference. At the time the advanced countries were shaping their economies, humanitarian ideals as we know them today had not been fully developed. The idea of social security had neither taken form nor caught the imagination of politicians. Today, however, the idea is echoed everywhere—even in the underdeveloped countries themselves. For the governments of underdeveloped countries, therefore, to refrain completely from making an initial step towards the provision of social security on an appreciable scale would be a dangerous political omission for the ruling

parties. On the other hand, as already pointed out, full-scale social security is simply not possible. The compromise seems to be the provision of some measure of social security for those of the aged, infirm and disabled who have no one to depend upon. Under such an arrangement, others, who would be eligible for assistance in more affluent circumstances, would be expected to depend on the resources of their relatives. To this extent the proposal is a compromise between traditional and modern forms of social security.

Promotion of a sense of purpose and participation among the masses requires popular indigenous leadership dedicated (after the attainment of independence) to economic and social modernization; a mass nationalist movement; and initiation of development programmes in which the masses (i.e. rural populations) can participate. In addition, an efficient network of media of mass communication through which to pass information, messages, and news to the people is absolutely essential.

Encouragement of a sense of fellowship and belonging among the races demands that the leaders of new countries recognise that the annihilation of distance by modern modes of travel has turned planet earth into one country inhabited by one race—the human race; that the co-existence of black, white, yellow and brown in various parts of the globe is, therefore, logical and well nigh inevitable; that the economic exploitation which foreign races are accused of originated and prospered in historical circumstances for which no one individual or race can be held responsible; that with the advent of independence exploitation can, and should, be put an end to, without victimisation; that under friendly guidance immigrant races can have a real contribution to make to the development of the countries in which they live; and that the ejection of foreign races would so disturb the equilibrium of things that it would almost halt—temporarily no doubt—the wheels of progress. A recognition of these realities would enable the leaders to encourage themselves and their people to accept immigrant peoples as fellow citizens. This

acceptance would give immigrant races a sense of belonging which would in turn determine the measure of their contribution to development.

3. There has been much talk in recent years about common markets and 'political re-grouping'. These schemes have been mooted in West Africa and echoed in South, Central and East Africa. What, exactly, do they mean and are they practical propositions? Here we are mainly concerned with common markets. Political regrouping is considered only in so far as it becomes a concomitant of economic integration.

A common market or an economic union involves the removal of tariff, immigration and other barriers in order to enable goods, labour and capital to flow freely between the countries forming the common market. A common market may or may not involve a political federation. But if it does, then we have 'political re-grouping'.

An economic union without political association is a practical and beneficial proposition only if the following conditions are fulfilled:

(a) The participating countries must be more or less on the same level of industrial development. If one of the countries is more industrialized than the others, the union will work to the detriment of the less industrialized countries which will serve merely as protected markets for the manufactured products of the more industrialized country.

(b) It must be ascertained at the very outset that the products—primary *or* manufactured—of each member country will find markets in the other member countries. The main advantage of an economic union is the enlargement of the market and the possibility of specialization which accrues from it. But that enlargement must mean a bigger market for the products of not only one country but all member countries. Otherwise it is of no advantage to the country (s)

which have to secure markets for *all* their products beyond the borders of the union.

(c) There must be a central authority to plan the location of certain industries so that duplication is avoided.

(d) There must be a clear understanding that the central authority shall not prevent the development of a multi-sectoral economy in any member country provided that such development does not conflict with the preceding requirement.

(e) The central authority must be vested with power to enforce and prevent violation of decisions regarding the location of industries.

In addition to the foregoing conditions, a political federation-cum-economic union is a sound and advantageous proposition IF :

(f) Agreement can be reached on the basic objectives of economic policy. Failure to observe this requirement is sufficient in itself to wreck the federation. There can be no lasting cooperation between a federal government which is guided by the doctrine of *neo-laissez faire* and a state government which is committed to the principles of, say, a *Pragmatic Pattern of Development*.

(g) The role of the federal government in economic affairs can be clearly defined and approved by the people as a true reflection of their economic philosophy. Unless this is done, there will be some states which will complain that the federal government is failing in its duty of generating economic development and others which will take the view that it is interfering too much in economic affairs. Such feelings, if harboured for a considerable time, can poison and kill the federation.

(h) Equitable principles to guide the distribution of current and capital expenditure of the federal govern-

ment between the races and the territories can be worked out and agreed upon. A federation is doomed to breakup if current or development expenditure is weighted in favour of any one race or territory.

(i) It is proposed that the burden of federal taxation shall be distributed among the races and the states in accordance with the principle of the 'ability to pay'.

(j) It can be agreed that one of the objectives of federal economic policy shall be the immediate expansion of the range of exports from the federation. A federal set-up will insure each of the member states against violent fluctuations in revenue only if this requirement is met.

(k) There is a genuine desire among the majority of the the people for such a federation. This is by far the most important condition. If it is not fulfilled, the federation cannot last even if it may be propped up by confidence tricks and guns for a while.

(l) A democratic federal constitution guaranteeing to each state fair representation in the federal parliament can be drawn up, approved, and adopted by the majority of *all* the inhabitants. A federation based on a phoney constitution and a fancy franchise is a delusion for its protagonists as well as its apologists.

4. 'Neglect of rural areas' stems mainly from the fact that modern African political leaders are creatures of the towns. Most of them grow up, live and die in urban centres—even if they may be born in rural areas. They tend, therefore, to be more attached to urban areas than to rural areas. This tendency is reflected in development activities. Driven by their desire to have within easy reach a few 'show pieces' to point to when distinguished foreign guests visit their countries and made complacent by their rather superficial knowledge of conditions in the rural areas, African leaders—and others in similar situations—devote most of their development

resources to towns. But sound development, political stability and cooperation between government and people require that the masses should enjoy a sense of participation. That sense of participation cannot exist unless the leaders initiate schemes which involve, and improve the lot of, rural populations. Leaders must launch community development programs for : (a) the construction of physical assets in rural areas, (b) the education of rural adults, (c) the popularization of better farming methods and better health measures, (d) the promotion of handicraft aud small-scale industries, and, (e) encouraging greater participation in local government affairs. Over and above that, there is need for leaders to familiarize themselves with the conditions in which their rural compatriots live. Only such a familiarization will enable them to appreciate the urgency of the problem of rural development.

5. Few economic problems are as challenging as the need to stabilise African industrial labour. Labour turnover—the tendency to quit one's job after being at it for only a short period—can involve young governments in formidable waste of development resources.

Men flock in from rural areas to take up jobs in industrial enterprises. They are taught certain skills. But no sooner is the training over than they decide to return 'home'. Thus money, time and valuable effort will have been wasted on training men who will keep no track with industry. Worse still, when these men return to the industrial centres for another bout of employment there is no arrangement to get them back to the jobs for which they were trained. The result is that they take up new jobs for which they have to receive new training. But before long the process is repeated all over again: the men turn their backs on industry and head for 'home'. Governments and industrialists who have schemes for training foremen, charge hands, mechanics, artisans and other skilled or semi-skilled workers face precisely the same, and no less a problem. This will probably prove to be one of the most intractable problems confronting African governments.

The question must be asked: why is it that Africans from rural areas find it difficult to sink roots in industrial centres? Why won't they settle down to regular industrial employment? There are six answers to this question:

(a) Because they feel lonely in urban areas. An African who has been brought up in an extended family system under which family ties are very strong cannot bear to be away from his family and relations for long. He is subjected to a loneliness which comes close to being a torture. Those who are brought up in horizontal family systems may not fully appreciate its intensity. But it is there—real, intense, merciless.

(b) Because towns subject them to a sense of insecurity. Tribal life revolves round the institution of 'mutual aid and cooperation' from which people derive a tremendous sense of security. Like land, it is the equivalent of banks, savings, insurance policies, old age pensions, national assistance schemes, and social security. This 'mutual aid and cooperation' is non-existent in towns because urban communities are made up of people drawn from not one but numerous tribes —conglomerations in which the institution cannot survive even if it were introduced.

(c) Because they have obligations to their people 'back home' which can be fulfilled only in person. The people who come to work in industrial centres are at once children of their parents, fathers, husbands, brothers and uncles. According to African custom they must, therefore, look after and take over the responsibilities of their ageing parents; they must periodically build houses for themselves and 'the old people' ; they must initiate their male children in the customs and traditions of their tribes; and they must discharge their duties as husbands—all of which cannot be done from afar.

(d) Because they find it trying to adjust themselves to the mode of life of the urban areas. Town life bears little resemblance to the life they lead in rural areas. In fact it is a wonder that they are able to put up with the complexities and vicissitudes of urban life for as long as they do. The gap between the two ways of life is so wide that one can cross it perma-

nently only at the risk of protracted psychological discomfort. It is a far cry from the world of the hoe, deer hunting, war dances, canoe regattas and moral rectitude to that of the conveyor belt, tennis, tango and promiscuity.

(e) Because a good many of them feel that one cannot bring up children properly in towns. Juvenile delinquency, hooliganism, prostitution, marriage instability, greed and individualism which characterize life in urban areas are revolting to rural peoples. That is why those of them who are forced by circumstances to ask their wives to join them in towns send their children 'back home', to be brought up in the traditional way.

(f) Because their goals are realized quickly. Men who come to towns have definite goals in mind. It may be the purchase of a sewing machine, a plough, a bicycle, clothes or kitchen utensils. They may be trying to raise money to enable them to build brick houses or to settle cases or to pay taxes. As soon as the goals are achieved, it is deemed time to put odds and ends together and head for home.

All these reasons combine to compel the rural African to return to the rural areas "where men are men and women are proud of them". For him, his departure is a return to sanity; but for governments and industrialists, it is the cause of a ticklish problem.

Several measures have been tried in an endeavour to stabilise African workers in towns. Cecil Rhodes contrived the trick of imposing taxes on Africans to compel them to seek paid employment. South African gold mines have introduced the system of 'contract labour' which forces the African worker to stay on his job for a specified period. In West Africa, some firms have tried wage differentials—a device by which those who stay on their jobs for long periods get much higher wages than the foot-loose workers who shift from one job to another. On the Copperbelt, in Northern Rhodesia, copper mines provide good medical services, houses and schools in the hope that such social services will encourage

African workers to settle in towns. Southern Rhodesian industrialists encourage African workers to bring their 'families' (by which is meant the wife and children of the worker) with them to their places of work.

But it is doubtful whether these measures are based on a real understanding of the forces which pull African labour back to the rural areas. Imposition of taxes and contract labour are certainly no solutions; they only succeed in torturing the African worker. Wage differentials and good social services are doubtful remedies. Encouraging workers to bring their families with them would be an effective solution were it that the African family consists of husband, wife and children. Unfortunately, it includes parents, uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews and cousins.

Any solution of this problem must take into account the reasons advanced above, namely that (a) the rural African feels lonely in urban areas, (b) he suffers from a sense of insecurity, (c) he has obligations to his rural relatives which can be fulfilled only in person, (d) he finds it trying to adjust himself to urban life, (e) he feels that he cannot bring up his children in towns, and (f) his economic goals are realised quickly.

The solutions dictated by these reasons would seem to be : (a) Arrangements must be made to enable each worker to bring with him as many of his relatives as possible and to provide employment to these relatives. In other words, what should be brought over to the industrial centres is not just one branch but the whole family tree. (b) It must be seen to that there are, in each African township, sufficient numbers of each tribe to make it possible for the institution of 'mutual aid and co-operation' to operate even if only after a fashion. (c) If (a) and (b) are done, it will be possible for the African worker to fulfil his obligations to his relative *at his place of work* thereby obviating the necessity of quitting employment and going 'back home'. (d) Re-orientation centres must be instituted to help new-comers to towns to adjust themselves to the new way of life. (e) Governments must do everything in their power to combat the evils of juvenile delinquency,

hooliganism, prostitution and marriage instability on the one hand, and to strengthen the moral values of the traditional way of life on the other; so that urban areas can become healthier places for bringing up children. (f) Efforts must be made to widen the range of wants of African workers. But this measure will bear fruit only after a considerable length of time.

6. The clash between trade union and economic development objectives arises because trade unions aim at maximizing incomes for their members while economic development requires that corporations should be left with substantial margins of profit.

The *raison d'etre* of a trade union is to secure for its members better remuneration and reasonable conditions of work. This is an honourable aim especially in Africa where for generations the African worker has been ruthlessly exploited and condemned to sub-human conditions of work. Laws must, therefore, be passed to facilitate the organization of sound trade union movements so that the work force can have effective bargaining power. This, however, is onlyone side of the problem. Economic development calls for the mobilization of domestic capital. People must save if there is to be an appreciable increase in the rate of investment. But in an under-developed economy people save very little—if at all. They cannot afford to. Their wages are far too low to permit any saving. In such an economy, saving is mainly the function of the government and corporations. Corporate savings come mostly from profits. The bigger the margin of profit, the larger the savings and *vice versa*. High wages mean small profit margins and therefore less savings. Thus, to set out to maximize the return to labour and to mobilize substantial domestic capital for development is to pursue contradictory objectives. Yet both objectives are worthwhile and must be pursued simultaneously. How is the conflict to be resolved ?

The solution lies in moderation and differential taxation. Labour must be encouraged to secure higher wages. But it

must be required to relate its wage claims to increase in its productivity. Absence of increase in production should be sufficient to disqualify any wage claim. There must also be an arrangement to ensure that wage increases do not reduce the level of profits below a fixed floor. Further, unofficial and irresponsible strikes should be legislated against. Corporations on the other hand must be encouraged, by differential taxation and inducements, to re-invest and invest a good proportion of their profits. There would be no point in fixing a profit floor if most of the profits are to be squandered in conspicuous consumption.

7. The difference between people who are advanced and those who are backward economically is that the range of wants of the former is much wider than that of the latter. Economic development, in the final analysis, turns out to be a process aimed at widening the range of wants of the economically backward. But this process of change in consumption patterns raises a serious problem.

As economic development proceeds, the incomes of those people who are engaged in economic activities rise. Should this additional purchasing power be channelled into the purchase of cars, liquor, sexual services, more wives, land, gaudy clothes, mansions, betting coupons, or trinkets? Or should it be spent on better and more varied food, good but modest houses, presentable but unpretentious clothes, educative entertainment and travel, better education for children as well as parents, good health services, and future security? Most people would agree that the second alternative is preferable to the first. The cumulative nature of economic development, its dependence on an ever-growing domestic market, its requirement of savings, and its demand for productive investments as also a healthy labour force, dictate that consumer expenditure should tend towards the second group of goods and services.

But what guarantee is there that new incomes will in fact be channelled into that direction? None. There is all the

possibility that goods and services in the first group will take a good proportion of the incomes. What should be done? Some would advocate prohibition against inconsequential expenditure. Those who believe in what has been called 'consumer supremacy' would hold the view that whatever else is done, the freedom of the consumer to buy whatever he chooses must not be curbed. Between these extremes of prohibition and licence there is a middle course which might meet the development requirements of young countries in Africa. Governments should accord freedom of choice to the consumer but they should also endeavour to influence him to look down upon the first group and to develop a liking for the second group of goods and services. There are several ways of doing this. Advertising is one, propaganda is another, while identification of prestige with the consumption of the second group of goods is yet another.

This is not an attempt to make encroachments on the liberty of the individual but a sincere endeavour to lay the foundations for greater consumer liberty in the future. It is a strategy which is relevant only to immature economies. It would become less and less necessary as the economies move towards maturity.

2. RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS

One Sunday morning a jovial prison officer walked into our detention camp and asked:

"Are you fellows in need of spiritual feed? I could fix you up with a priest. He is a likeable swine. We've got to hang on to something, you know?"

We declined the offer and told him that our main need just then was the right to vote so that we could be on equal footing with our pygmy brothers who in five months' time were going to participate in the Congo Independence elections while we were still unenfranchised.

"I don't blame you," he said, "still, we mustn't talk politics."

Tendency towards Religion

When he had gone, it occurred to me that in the sentence "we've got to hang on to something" he had summed up the attitude of the greater part of humanity to religion. It is a tendency of human nature to hold on to some kind of religion, however rudimentary. And this attitude is not peculiar to our age. Since time immemorial, mankind for some reason or other has felt the need to "hang on to something". The belief in God, or some supernatural power at least, has always been there, prompted perhaps by our concern about the fate of our souls.

In Africa, the need for some kind of religion would be disputed by very few people, if any. For one thing, Western democracy, to which the majority of African leaders are voluntarily committed, is founded on *religious* principles: equality, liberty, justice and respect for the dignity of the human individual. For another, socialist democracy (according to Professor Ogle of Perdue University) also aspires to ideals (equality, liberty and fraternity) that are very similar to those of Western democracy which is just another way of saying that socialist democracy is also based on religious principles[1]. So,

whether we are committed to socialist or capitalist democracy the fact remains that to make a success of either system, we must accept, and be guided by, the religious principles on which those systems are based. This means that we must first learn to cherish those non-contradictory spiritual verities which the prophets of God (Budhha, Zoroaster, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and Baha'ullah) have promulgated at various times and, secondly, order our lives on the individual as well as on the national plane according to those principles.

Moreover, only a high degree of moral integrity and a sense of proportion among the leaders can ensure that they will not turn themselves into dictators. The temptation to assume dictatorial powers in new countries is great. It may come about because citizens are not trusting enough or because they are too trusting. It may be backed by good or ghastly motives. Whatever the cause and whatever the motive behind the temptation, only honesty of purpose, moral integrity, selflessness, humility, patience and solicitude can nip malice in the bud, annihilate the power mania, stifle vanity and stay away dictatorship. But the fountain from which these virtues spring is religion. And by religion I am referring not only to Christianity but also to Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and the Bahai' Faith. For, as Iqbal has said, "There is only one religion; but there are many versions of it" ; or as Arnold Toynbee has put it, "The historic religions and philosophies are partial revelations of the same truth in one or other of its aspects".

Finally, the need for a religious faith arises also in connection with the spiritual needs of the masses. In Africa, we are on the eve of an unprecedented era. We have encouraged our peoples to hope for a better future. But, let us face it, it is quite possible that some of these hopes will be completely shattered or partially fulfilled. Such misfortunes have been experienced by others in the past. It is therefore reasonable to assume that our people will have their share of pathos and bathos, of anxious waiting and rejoicing, of misgivings and

1. In "Public Opinion and Political Dynamics"

disillusionment, of poverty and prosperity, of frustrated and realized ambitions, of doubts and hope about the hereafter, of problems arising from the process of family disorganisation, tribal disintegration and value change. To hold their own against all these vicissitudes, the masses, if not the leaders, will need the cushioned bastion of religious faith. They will need the belief that the All-powerful, the Undisputed Master of the Universe, is piloting the ship in which they and their leaders are travelling to the bay of plenty.

Indifference and its Causes

To admit the need for religious faith, however, is one thing; to make efforts to embrace one is another matter altogether. I would venture to say that there are very few leaders in Africa who do not appreciate the need for religion. But it is also true that it is these very leaders and the majority of their educated compatriots who are the most indifferent to religion. This indifference is a continent-wide phenomenon which deserves to rank as one of the major social problems of Africa. It is a problem in the sense that in a continent where the masses look up to their new leaders with affectionate reverence, agnosticism or indifference to religion on the part of the leaders is likely to be imitated down the social scale with disasterous consequences. Devoid of a religious conscience Africa, or any other continent for that matter, cannot get very far. So we must pause and ask why educated Africans in general and educated African leaders in particular are indifferent to religion.

Generally speaking, most African leaders are indifferent to religion because a good many of the religious practices conflict with the nationalistic goal of "national unity". To illustrate: the tendency of protestantism to split into numerous sects (there were over 350 sects in 1960) makes the task of those Africans who are trying to close the gaps of tribal difference, to bury parochialism and to foster national consciousness infinitely more difficult. The question then arises as so what should be sacrificed: freedom of worship or national unity? African leaders cannot sacrifice national unity -- being,

as it is, the symbol of all that they live for. On the other hand, sacrificing freedom of worship by enforcing religious conformity conjures up visions of religious strife and world-wide criticism which few would relish. The reaction of African leaders to this dilemma has been a recoiling away from formal religious activities.

The second reason for indifference to religion is the fact that many churches are dominated by foreigners. In the minds of many educated Africans, foreign domination, whether secular or religious, is synonymous with colonialism. The domination of foreigners in church matters is thus looked upon, rightly or wrongly, as another aspect of colonialism. And since colonialism is abhorred, that hatred is automatically extended to those churches which are dominated by foreigners. The Presbytarian Church of Scotland, Nyasaland, with a deft finger on the pulse of African feelings, saw this danger a few years ago and set about willingly to hand over church leadership to the Africans. As a result, they have won the respect and love of their congregation, the educated Africans in general and above all the African leaders.

Further, some African leaders have come to believe that foreign dominated Christian churches, wittingly or unwittingly infuse in their uneducated African adherents the belief that Europeans are supernatural beings who must, by reasons of that superiority, be the leaders and rulers. This belief is strongest among those Africans who come under the direct influence of foreign missionaries. It is exhibited in their activities as well as in their outlook. Some of these people do not hesitate to dissuade their friends and relatives from joining nationalist organisations and from participating in nationalist activities on the ground that the hold of Europeans cannot be dislodged. Others pooh-pooh any suggestion that Africans can do what Europeans do and detest anyone who seems to vie with Europeans in any way. This tacit acceptance of inferiority is not an asset in the task of nation-building and few leaders could be expected to take kindly to any institution which fosters, however indirectly, this belief. Their protest against such a fallacy

takes various forms one of which is an aversion against religious activities.

Other people shun religion on the ground that it is an opiate. They claim that it makes the masses adopt an "otherworldly" outlook and resign themselves to oppression, social injustice and poverty. This fatalistic attitude, it is contended, is partly responsible for the relative backwardness of Africa. If, therefore, Africa is to make a break with stagnation fatalism must go. This, so the argument goes, must entail the avoidance of religion, the cause of fatalism. It may be true that religion makes Africans resign themselves to oppression etc., but it seems hardly true that the solution to this problem is total avoidance of religion. People can learn to seek redress for the wrong done against them, to remove the agents of oppression and to aspire to better things without necessarily renouncing their spiritual beliefs. However, whether we find this kind of reasoning cogent or not is beside the point; the fact to reckon with is that there are people to whom this argument has a strong appeal.

Yet others fight shy of religion because they find the kind of life encouraged by the churches too artificial. These people complain that the life which foreign missionaries lead is too far removed from reality to be an example to the ordinary folks. The ideal is too far beyond the reach of the people that any ambition to attain it dies at birth. Consequently, mission stations which should serve as demonstration centres of a new, practical way of life tend to be regarded as island zoos where a quaint way of life of strange inhabitants may be observed.

Matters are made worse by the migration of Africans to towns. Young Africans leave mission station schools to look for employment in the urban areas where life is conducted in a manner which makes nonsense of the disciplines imposed at mission stations. The mental juxtaposition of a life of restrictions and controls practised by a tiny band of foreign missionaries and a life of no-bars indulged in with reckless abandon by foreigners and indigenes alike, in urban areas, serves only to confirm the artificiality of life at mission stations. Further,

the concern of foreign missionaries with spiritual matters almost to the exclusion of the material pursuits of life can only repel those who have dedicated their lives to material, but no less worthy, causes.

Once the influential Africans have adopted an indifferent attitude to religion the trend snowballs. Those who look up to them also become indifferent to religion. What is not appreciated by foreigners is that educated Africans wield influence, among their less enlightened brethren, which is out of all proportion to their numerical strength. At present mass imitation in Africa is oriented towards the indigenous elite. Foreigners are a reference group for the African masses only, I would venture to say, through the African elite—only, that is to say, so long as the elite endorses, tacitly or otherwise, the trend of imitation. This is the tendency which underlines the dire need for African leaders and their educated compatriots to adopt considered attitudes and the right modes of behaviour.

In addition to the foregoing, there are other causes of a universal nature. Foremost among these are those advanced by the Vice-President of India, Dr. Sarvapali Radhakrishnan, a philosopher and statesman of rare quality.

Dr. Radhakrishnan declares that "many people are repelled (from religion) by the dogmatic creeds...of organised religion.....There are .....people who, with crusading zeal, affirm that they have the monopoly of a final, unique, exclusive and incomparable revelation. These people are indirectly responsible for the eclipse of religion, for the blight of unbelief in large parts of the world." He quotes Professor A.N. Whitehead who felt that some of the people to blame for this were "the interpreters of Christianity, who shut out all discussion and declared that they knew all there was to be known on the subject." And observes that "for men steeped in the spirit of science and criticism, a return to religious orthodoxy is a sign of cowardice."

Another reason put forward by Radhakrishnan is hypocrisy and condonation. "If men are dissatisfied with religion,

it is because religious organisations happen to be advocates of external piety and not spiritual life and are often the champions of the *status quo*." Also "... lack of moral indignation against social injustice (on the part of the religious organisations) is responsible for the present indifference to religion."

Lastly, he believes that "those who sponsor religious propaganda in their zeal for the spiritual welfare of their fellow men indulge in a vulgar competition, about the know-how of salvation,"[1] which cannot fail to repel sensitive people.

Removing the Causes of Indifference.

Having pointed out some of the causes of indifference to religion and having at the same time admitted the need for religion, we might now consider the possibility of removing some of the causes in an endeavour to encourage a return to religion. This is a task mainly of religious organisations. The nature of the causes is such that the initiative will have to be taken by religious institutions.

First, as pointed out earlier, the conflict between the nationalistic goal of national unity and the religious ideal of freedom of worship accompanied by the multiplicity of sects cannot be resolved by enforcing religious conformity nor by abandoning the aim of national unity. This is a unique dilemma calling for unique tact. Some of the things which religious bodies might do are : minimization of section differences and jealousies, the magnification of the similarity of denominational foundations, and fostering the awareness among their African members that they belong not only to their particular localities or tribes but also to a larger unit—the nation. Efforts along these lines might go a long way to reassure African leaders that religious organisations are not deliberately trying to aid colonialism in a divide-and-rule campaign; and this might have the effect of changing their unfavourable disposition towards religion into a favourable one.

The problem of foreign domination in church matters has a straightforward answer ; there must be an accelerated

[1] In his "Occasional Speeches and Writings."

transfer of responsibility to Africans. The alternative is to hang on to leadership against which there is growing disfavour and see impressive congregations dwindle to tiny clusters of doubtful adherents. To this suggestion some will say, "If you'd only know that it's easier said than done! Where do we get qualified Africans to take over from ?" This, however, is more of a vote of no-confidence than a convincing plea. It is no credit at all to any foreign mission which has operated among Africans for twenty or fifty years to fail at the end of that period to find suitably trained Africans to hand over a major portion of the responsibility to. Any way, provided the decision to transfer responsibility has been taken, the training of Africans should not take unduly long. It should be added, perhaps, that transfer of responsibility does not imply the return of foreign missionaries back to Europe, America or wherever they came from. If anything, it necessitates their presence. The Africans who will take over will need to be initiated in the traditions of patience, devotion, perseverence, and routine work. They will need the technical know-how which the foreign missionaries possess. They will need the company of foreign missionaries to broaden their outlook. The main difference that the transfer of responsibility to Africans will bring about is that (a) it will restore self-reliance, self-confidence, self-respect, initiative and give birth to "a sense of participation" among Africans and (b) it will make it possible for the foreign missionaries to work 'with' instead of 'for' the people.

The transfer of responsibility to Africans would also have another salutary effect : it would dispel the belief, among some Africans, that Africans cannot do what White people do. More direct efforts would have to be made, however, to explode the myth that Europeans are supernatural beings. Categorical statements to this effect by the foreign missionaries themselves would do the trick.

While conceding that the belief that religion is an opiate lacks force as a cause of indifference to religion, it should be emphasised that religious organisations could do a great deal

to encourage their African members to adopt a more dynamic attitude towards life. The belief that man can control his physical environment, that higher levels of living are possible and that greater freedom is a pre-requisite of self-development must be fervently instilled in the people.

As for piety, it is easy to push it to pietism. There would be nothing wrong in pitching the ideal of saintly life as high as one cared were it not for the consideration that others with less stamina have to be taken along. In this connection I am reminded of the story of two African couples. They were travelling from one village to another across a flooded river. One of the men told his wife to wait on the bank on which they were standing while he forded the river to see how strong the current was. When he got on to the other side he called to his wife : "Darling it's nothing to be afraid of. The water is a bit too cold, that's all. Just wade along and you'll be here safe and sound." Maybe there was nothing to be afraid of but his wife tried it, got the fright of her life and scampered back to the bank. The other man knew his woman. He reassured his wife that it was nothing to be afraid of but in addition he took hold of her arm and waded with her to the other side of the river.

There is some similarity between the attitude of these men and that of some foreign missionaries. The moral of the story is that if the missionaries cross the river by themselves and then call to their African congregations to do the same, the chances are that the people will give up in despair. The challenge will be too great for them. On the other hand, if they ford the river together with their congregations, the people will pick up courage and respond successfully to the challenge. For people to climb on to the plateau of holy life, they need not only a pathfinder to blaze the trail but also a guide to re-assure them that the task of ascent is anything but difficult. The tip to foreign missionaries is that they must be at once down-to-earth people who know the material aspirations of Africans, who can mix freely with them but who can also rise, and guide others, to higher planes of spiritual as well as material life. It is this kind of balanced outlook which is

likely to win the respect of educated Africans and perhaps in that way call a halt to their boycott of religious activities. It is people whom we respect and admire, not those whom we despise and dislike, that influence our lives.

The snowballing effect of imitated indifference cannot be checked by eliminating the tendency of imitation. It is just not possible. But even if it were possible, such a course of action is unnecessary. What is required is to make sure that a fair proportion of things that are imitated are spiritually sound. Since the crucial element in the process of imitation is the African elite, this means that efforts must be made to ensure that the elite holds the right beliefs. This is a Himalayan task—having regard to the present attitude of educated Africans to religion. Example rather than precept is the strategy to be recommended for this type of African. The most effective people for this task are the techno-missionaries—people like Guy Clutton-Brock who although neck and shoulder above most Europeans and Africans conducts himself as if he were an equal of everyone, who never allows biblical language to escape his lips in conversation, yet whose life is the paragon of virtue, who is so all-round that he can give practical advice on how to tackle almost any day-to-day problem, who identifies himself so much with Africans that he goes even to the extent of joining their nationalist organisations, a man who is at home with philosophers as well as African peasants, a man who is so sincere and so understanding that he has won the love, admiration, respect and confidence of almost all the African leaders in Central Africa. It is this type of missionary that is wanted, nay, needed and direly, in the new Africa.

Ways of removing some of the causes mentioned by Radhakrishnan include the following : (a) reliance on the discussion rather than the sermon technique; (b) lending moral support to those forces which strive to establish a new and better order; (c) condemning social injustice where it exists; and (d) avoiding competition tactics in drives for proselytes.

In his monumental 'Study of History', Arnold Toynbee speaks of "the idolisation of an ephemeral self", "the idolization of an ephemeral institution" and "the idolization of an

ephemeral technique". The practice of acquainting people with the word of God via the pulpit is, to my mind, a good example of "the idolization of an ephemeral technique". The technique was an appropriate one in the days of mass illiteracy and is still the right one in those parts of the world, like Africa, where literacy is low. But in countries where literacy is high, the thought of going to church to listen unquestiongly to a monologue appeals only to the devout and those who are wedded to tradition. It jars against the spirit of rationality which is the torchlight of an advanced society. Those who like change and a scientific approach to things are likely to welcome the seminar and group discussion technique which allows participants to listen, question, comment, think aloud, agree or disagree. The Bahai's are using this technique with remarkable success even in Africa. Generally speaking, however, this is perhaps not quite the right technique for African masses. But, I believe, it would work successfully with educated Africans and might succeed in renewing their interest in religious affairs.

Nothing alienates the feeling of African leaders more than actions—by religious organisations—which are directed towards the maintenance of the political *status quo*. This is not to say that African leaders expect religious organisations to be active supporters of nationalist organisations. Very few would be willing to be that extravagant in their expectations. What they do feel, and strongly, is that the churches should not say or do anything which will make the nationalist struggle more difficult or discourage their African converts from identifying themselves with nationalist movements. In view of the tide of freedom which is rushing across Africa, religious organisations would be lashing themselves to the mast of a sinking vessel if they tried, in concert with other forces, to perpetuate the *status quo*. Prudence and foresight would seem to dictate a policy of lending moral support to, if not of fraternization with, the new forces bearing in mind the fact that change is an integral feature of human societies.

When churches, for whatever reason, slur over and condone social injustice, they remove by that omission a good

part of the justification of their existence and people have then the right to disassociate themselves from such parodies of an otherwise indispensable institution. Africa has groaned in the past, is wailing at present and will probably yell in the future under the yoke of oppression and exploitation. It should be the duty of the churches to expose the injustices, if not to censure without malice, those responsible. It is that kind of bold vigilance which is likely to raise the churches in the eyes of Africans and to attract them to the fold of religion.

Finally, although not a major cause of indifference to religion, open competition between religious organisations must be avoided as much as possible. It is repulsive enough to disgust some of the influential people. How best to do so is probably best left to the organisations concerned.

New Outlook Required

The foregoing suggestions are not put forward as proven ways of removing the causes of indifference to religion but merely as talking points to stimulate thought and discussion among those interested. The most efficacious way of reviving the interest of educated Africans in religion will undoubtedly be hit upon by those who are engaged in missionary work. But lay as the suggestions are, they do succeed in making one think clearly and that is that the task is formidable. It calls for revolutionary thinking, a change in strategy and an entirely new approach. More specifically, three things are required for tackling it, namely, a new outlook, new relationships and new blood.

First, old-time missionaries must revise their ideas about Africans, must modify their personal ideals, renounce paternalism, must adopt an experimental attitude, must be less emotional towards other denominations as well as other religions and above all they must allow themselves to be infected by the enthusiasm of their younger colleagues. Failure to do so will leave them ill-prepared for the new tasks and thus turn them into liabilities rather than assets.

Secondly, missionaries must put an end to their exclusiveness. There are a good many of them who are guilty of living

secluded lives in the midst of companionable people some of whom are well equipped to provide enlightened companionship. By design they come in contact with Africans only at the school, in the chapel, at committee meetings, at the hospital, or in the office and spend the rest of their time hugging or wrestling with solitude. On their faces you can often read disgruntledness superimposed on a background of racial hatred which apes racial goodwill. This is not the frame of mind in which to face the new tasks. These tasks call for racial mixing, human warmth, mutual trust, unflagging optimism and genuine love for others—all of which are incompatible with isolationism.

Most important, however, is the introduction of new blood, of younger people to revitalize life at mission stations, to spearhead the new campaigns and to direct the new programmes. What are needed are spirited young people who have the sense both to value useful traditions and to refuse to be swallowed up by the sacred cow to meaningless routine. It would help a great deal if some of these young people were given decision-making posts right from the very start. They would make mistakes, of course, but then who doesn't ? The presence of enthusiastic young "go-getters" is so vital that it is worth the price of the occasional mistakes which they are likely to make. "Enthusiasm," says R. H. Shauffler, "is the thing that makes the world go round. Without its driving power, nothing worth doing has ever been done." And Charles F. Kettering, one of the most outstanding American business executives, declares: "I don't want men of experience working for me. The experienced man is always telling me why something can't be done. He is smart; he is intelligent; he thinks he knows the answers. The fellow who has not had any experience is so dumb he doesn't know a thing can't be done and he goes ahead and does it."

The change in missionary personnel and outlook is required not only for the task of removing the causes of indifference to religion and resuscitating the interest of educated Africans in religious matters but also for other tasks to be enumerated presently.

The New Tasks

Just as it is necessary to revise ideas about Africans so also is it necessary to reappraise the duties which the missions perform. The panorama of Africa is moving fast. The aspirations of the people have changed. Politically, the masses are determined to rally behind their nationalist leaders in an effort to achieve freedom.

Economically their leaders are busy scanning new horizons. Socially, the reformers among them want more enlightenment, better health, higher levels of living and uncompromised justice for the masses. The meaning of all this is that Africans are becoming more and more concerned about their material welfare. What the missions do therefore must reflect, and be in keeping with, this new trend, otherwise time, effort and money will be sunk in schemes which Africans won't look at. Among the things which missions can do to that end are the following: (a) the training of secular leaders, (b) the training of farmers and businessmen, (c) launching community development projects, and (d) tackling social problems.

If the wish of religious organisations is—and I am sure it is—to see the new Africa led by leaders who accept God and the teachings of his prophets, then they must take steps to train such leaders. Hoping that the right leaders will be forthcoming somehow is no better than hoping that military generals will be forthcoming on the spur of the moment from among miners. Sometimes it does happen but only sometimes.

The type of young men who should be eligible for this kind of training are, strange as it may seem, the so-called "impossible but intelligent" high school boys. It is these boys who possess the necessary qualities (*e.g.* assertiveness) for political leadership. The "obedient and intelligent" boys make first-rate administrators but inferior politicians. When the boys have been chosen, they should be sent to Europe, America or to the East to take degree courses in those subjects which directly relate to politics, namely, Political Science, History, Economics and Law. While under training they should be exposed to the influence of well-balanced politicians and clergymen to drive it home to the boys first that able politicians can also be

religious. Secondly, that interest in religion does not preclude interest in politics and, thirdly, that the two are compatible if not complementary. No attempt should be made to turn the boys into semi-priests. For one thing, they are the type that will rebel; for another it is not necessary. The aim should be to make them good, lay Christians, Bahai's Moslems, etc. And for this what are needed are: the right environment, good company, understanding hosts and examples of balanced politicians.

It should not be assumed that when these boys return to their countries they will automatically become political leaders. Rising to political leadership is not the same thing as obtaining a job. In the business world one is virtually assured a job if one has the appropriate qualifications. In politics, neither academic qualification nor ambition guarantees one success. It is a game of chance in which one contends with many unpredictables. The idea should be to have within each country a reserve of suitably qualified, God-fearing men who can assume political leadership when called upon to do so by their people. The greater the reserve, the greater the chance that political leadership will be in the hands of the right people. It is important for religious organisations to concentrate on the training of political leaders as experience has shown that governments, even nationalist governments, neglect this kind of training and worry only about the training of administrators, engineers and technicians.

The need to train farmers and businessmen arises from the realization (a) that the key to higher standards of living in the initial stages of economic development is greater productivity in the agricultural sector, and (b) that lasting economic development requires that Africans should be brought into the orbit of an exchange economy not only as labourers but also as entrepreneurs. Hitherto, government emphasis has been on the training of field assistance to take up jobs in the agricultural departments. As for businessmen, there have not been any facilities at all for their training. What is required now, if national incomes are to increase, is the training of both employees and employers. The objective should

be to train men who will (a) go into the rural areas and establish themselves as independent modern farmers, (b) participate in commerce, and (c) establish small-scale industries. In this task religious organisations can play a vital role. Most of them have educational institutions which could be expanded or reorganised to include such training facilities. And it is most probable that governments would subsidize such schemes. In some countries these efforts would be merely supplementary to those of the government; in others the reverse would be true. In either case, the efforts would result in a valuable contribution which might make all the difference between a slow and an accelerated rate of development.

The idea of community development grew from the sombre observation that scientific and technological advances which had done much to improve the material welfare of urban populations had scarcely affected the lives of rural populations. More and more it became clear that it was impolitic to concentrate on providing social services for the urban minorities while the rural majorities were neglected. Those who felt strongly on the matter set about to find ways and means of bettering the lot of the masses in the rural areas. They came up with the idea of community development which has gained increasing support throughout the world, including the endorsement and backing of the United Nations.

"Community development can be defined as a process designated to create conditions of economic and social progress for the whole community with its active participation and the fullest possible reliance upon the community's initiative. 'Community development' implies the integration of two sets of forces making for human welfare, neither of which can do the job alone: (i) the opportunity and capacity for co-operation and self-help, ability to assimilate and adopt new ways of living that is latent in every human group; and (i) the fund of techniques and tools in every social and economic field, drawn from world-wide experience and now in use or available to national governments and agencies."* It deals with such

*From a U. N. publication

projects as : (a) the popularization of better farming methods, (b) the adoption of public health measures, (c) the organisation of adult education classes, (d) promotion of recreational activities, (e) the setting up of village councils, and (f) the construction of community centres, wells, rural roads and bridges. This is a challenging, exciting new field—a field which should capture the imagination of young missionaries—nurses, doctors, teachers, social workers, agriculturists, architects, carpenters, engineers—whatever their profession. As it has also drawn the attention of African leaders who are already taking keen interest in this kind of work, missionaries must expect to work in co-operation with governments in those countries where Africans have a major say in the government. This co-operation must be welcomed as it might prove to be one of the most effective means of building mutual confidence between foreign missionaries and African governments.

Finally, religious organisations must also address themselves to social problems. There are two types of social problems: those which relate to rural populations and those which follow in the wake of industrialization and urbanization. The latter type includes : (1) prostitution and concubinage, (2) the instability of marriages, (3) juvenile delinquency, and (4) appalling living conditions. The former type refers mainly to (5) the negative effects of introducing an exchange economy in a subsistence economy, and (6) problems brought about by the migration of rural people to industrial areas. Here, again, religious organisations must co-operate with governments. Indeed the nature of the problems is such that collaboration is inevitable.

No problem can be solved unless its causes are known. So, one of the first tasks of those who would tackle the above problems is to analyse the problems in order to determine their causes in more precise terms. What follows is a summary of the causes put forward by several social scientists who

have studied these problems.*

First, the scientists claim that prostitution and concubinage are brought about:

(a) By an imbalance (in Brazzaville) between the numbers of men and women.

(b) Because women (in Leopoldville) prefer concubinage to marriage on the ground that the former permits more freedom.

(c) Because parents (in Leopoldville) encourage their daughters to become concubines as children born in concubinage become members of the mother's family whereas those born in wedlock go to swell the members of their father's clan.

(d) Because girls (in Leopoldville) find it difficult to get husbands in the face of strong prejudice against inter-tribal marriages and a shortage of men from their own tribes.

(e) Because "the absence of any new form of civil marriage contract (in Broken Hill)...denies to many potentially permanent unions the binding force of law."

(f) Because prostitutes and concubines (in Tanganyika) are no longer ostracised or held in contempt. (Author)

(g) By the presence (in South Africa) of large numbers of "unattached girls."

(h) Because people (in South Africa) are finding it more and more difficult—as the institution of bride price becomes commercialised—to find the money for marriage payments.

(i) By the lack of parental control over young people, and

(j) By overcrowding and its concomitant of anonymity. (Author)

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*i.e. Those writers the summaries of whose studies are included in Part Two of *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara* particularly Meran McCulloch, K. A. Busia, G. Balandier, E. Capelle, S. Combaire-Sylvain, G. Wilson, P. Ibbotson, E. Hellman, M. Hunter, R. E. Phillips and Schapera. Some of the information in this respect is from *A Special Study of Economic Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories* (1958).

Secondly, it is argued that in urban areas marriages are unstable mainly because:

(a) The running cost of marriage—the cost of supporting wife and children—is high.

(b) The imbalance between males and females results in prostitution and the prevalence of prostitutes who make loose living possible on the part of husbands.

(c) "The economic independence of (some) women" removes the basis of mutual dependence between husband and wife.

(d) Those wives who are compelled by circumstances to take up employment find it difficult to reconcile their two roles.

(e) Marriages contracted in towns "lack the binding force" of customary law.

(f) Husbands are sometimes forced by unemployment to move from one place to another in search of work. But by the time they settle down their wives may have attached themselves to other men if only to save themselves from starvation. (Author)

Thirdly, Ibbotson gives the following list of causes of juvenile delinquency:

(a) "Unsatisfactory home conditions, including the breakdown of family life, the lack of parental control (e.g. when both parents work), loose living by one or both parents, desertion by one or both parents, unsatisfactory care of orphans, and crowded and unsatisfactory living conditions."

(b) "Poverty"—which leads to cases of theft.

(c) "Lack of educational discipline."

(d) "Lack of adequate leisure activities."

Lastly, appalling living conditions refer to : (a) overcrowding, (b) slum conditions, (c) unemployment, (d) poverty, (e) poor sanitation, (f) deficient medical facilities—the causes of all of which do not need enumeration.

In the rural areas we have a somewhat different set of problems. Here we shall reverse the process. Instead of looking for the "causes" we shall look for the "effects." Two things of far-reaching consequences are happening in these areas: people are migrating to the towns and an exchange economy is coming into existence. There are good and bad effects flowing from these phenomena. The good effects must be welcomed; the bad ones must be combated. Here we are interested only in the latter. What are these negative effects? Those which are associated with the growth of an exchange economy include:

1. The prevalence of individualism manifested in "a new struggle for personal enrichment."
2. The consequent breakdown of "the system of tribal or communal reciprocities."
3. The resultant feeling of insecurity among those who derived a sense of security from mutual aid.
4. Moral laxity and marital instability resulting from the growing economic independence of women.
5. The spread of polygamy among those who have surplus money with which to marry more women.
6. "The commercialization of 'bride price' with its effect of making marriage less attractive.
7. Conflicts arising from an inheritance system which is undergoing change in response to the pressure of new economic factors.

Various United Nations economic reports carry authoritative studies on the effects of migration. But as a concrete example of what happens when migration takes place we shall summarize the findings of Schapera who tells us that the migration of Bechuanaland Africans to the neighbouring territories in search of employment:

1. has reacted unfavourably on the traditional peasant economy of the reserves because:

(a) "most men who go abroad learn skills which are irrelevant in the home environment,"

(b) "young men who keep coming and going tend to regard the home periods as holidays."

(c) "many people are no longer available to attend to the the routine tasks of tribal life, as a result both animal husbandry and agriculture have suffered."

2. has weakened "tribal cohesion" because young men who have been abroad:

(a) "resent being called upon for tribal labour,"

(b) "neglect their tribal duties",

(c) "are insolent towards the chiefs and elders,"

(d) "have disrespect for traditional forms of control,"

(e) "indulge in sexual immorality."

3. is responsible for the introduction and spread of infectious diseases.

4. results "in many evils, including broken homes (and) desertion of wives by husbands and sons by parents..."

Once the causes and effects are known, the task of removing and dealing with them is not only relatively easy but also quite engaging. The writer believes that it would give religious organisations a sense of participation in this work if the problem of finding ways of removing the above causes were left to them. For this reason no attempt is made here to offer any suggestions to that end. It is hoped that committees, with some African members on them, will be appointed to handle this matter. Co-operation with the government, as pointed out earlier, is absolutely essential. As a matter of fact, there are causes (*e. g.* the imbalance between the sexes) which can be removed only by government action. In some countries, religious organisations will discover that the authorities are quite indifferent to these problems. In such countries it should be one of the duties of the committees to arouse the conscience of the leaders and the public against the evils in question and to call upon the government to take necessary action.

CONCLUDING NOTE

I set out to examine some of the basic problems of the New Africa. During the course of the discussion, I have deliberately refrained from analysing, or commenting on, current political problems. I believe that these problems are receiving adequate attention. Further, I hold the view that below the din of the Congo debacle, the Algerian guerilla warfare, the "gathering storm" in Central Africa and the explosive murmurs in South Africa, there are instransient problems which will survive the present political crises. These are the problems that can neither be dodged nor ignored. It is to them that we shall turn after the chore of sweeping away the debris of political chaos. So, the sooner we start working on them the better.

I have endeavoured to show that the problems are unmistakably gigantic and that they require mental vigour and originality of thought on the part of African leaders. I have emphasised the point that African leaders must not rely solely on "well-meaning" foreigners, lay or expert, for the solution of their problems. And, lastly, I have put forward the view that devoid of a religious conscience, Africa would be bereft of the elixir of life.

My hope is that the fire that drives and sustains the heroes of this troubled continent in their fight for freedom will rage on until the whole of Mother Africa is free, until she has risen to her full stature, until the recalcitrant foreigners in our continent have learnt to respect "the dignity of the human individual and the sanctity of his personality", and until African unity has been forged in the furnace of common misery.

My prayer is that the heroes of Africa may not indulge in the folly of personal rivalry, that they may temper self-assurance with humility, that the excessive power which circumstance may force them to assume may not corrupt them excessively, that they may resist the temptation to laze off their

lives in pomp and ceremony, that they may continue to look at the lot of the common man with the eyes of nationalists instead of those of aristocrats and above all that they may have the sense to know when they are no longer equal to the exigencies of their countries and the prudence of handing over to younger blood before they forfeit the admiration of their countrymen.

APPENDIX

A Message to the People of India by the Author

Friends,

From the people of Nyasaland, I bring you fraternal greetings. I came here partly to attend the seminar on Africa organised by the Indian Council for Africa and partly to see something of what your leaders—in collaboration with yourselves—are doing to better the lot of the common man.

When I left Nyasaland, I was under no illusion that I would acquire, during my short stay in this country, such expertise as would equip me to perform my tasks better on my return home. It takes a lot longer to gather useful information. My hope was that my visit to this country, however short, would afford me the opportunity to capture the spirit in which your leaders address themselves to the problems of India.

To that end I have seen the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the President, the Vice-President and many others. And I think I can confidently say that my hope has been realised. The energy and decisiveness of Nehru, the superior intellect of Radhakrishnan, the devastating logic of Menon, the human warmth of Rajendra Bapu and the enthusiasm of young Congress workers have all left their indelible impress on me.

Our countries are separated from each other by a vast expanse of water. Yet our problems, our dreams, our ideals and our hopes are nearly the same.

The problems of economic backwardness, social anachronism and political fluidity stare us in the face as much as they do you

We share the dream of resurgent Asia and Africa in which our peoples shall live in peace and happiness—free from the horrors of fear, exploitation, poverty, ignorance and disease.

Our eyes are turned towards the same ideals, namely, economic, social and political justice; equality of status, opportunity before the law; and freedom of thought, expression, worship, association, publication and movement.

We echo the view of your statesmen that a nuclear war will make no distinction between civilians and combatants, belligerents and onlookers, front and rear. We therefore hope —fervently hope—as you do, that those who had the determination to split the atom and unleash atomic power will have equal determination to tame it before the button of indiscriminate mass destruction is pressed in a moment of mad fury.

Such are the similarities between us. In case I have painted a picture of too close a similarity, I would like to mention a point of difference which will correct the picture and that is that you are free and a good many of us in Africa are not.

The non-White people of South Africa are wailing under the unmitigated tyranny of a callous tribe of Boers whose sanity has become an open question. These innocent victims, under the leadership of Sobukwe and Luthuli need moral support. But more than that they need financial assistance. Boer fascism is so thorough in its repressive methods that freedom fighters in that country can raise money from their followers only at the risk of imprisonment. Yet if the battle for freedom is to go on—and go on it must — they must have money. Shall we lend assistance or shall we sit tight and watch them suffer? Their needs are small but the stake is high.

To the Boers themselves, I would like to say : You are swimming against the stream of history and hoping against hope. The onrush of the tide of Freedom from the North is gathering momentum and before long you and the debris of your state-craft will be swept into the abyss of political oblivion. In your bid to do the impossible, you have only succeeded in doing what all knew you would ultimately do and that is to embitter your future rulers. Those of you who believe that Boer interests will be safeguarded by White

hegemony are compromising with delusion, for Free Africa will not tolerate on its soil a state which is the symbol of the humiliations of foreign domination. It is not too late to recant. If you can't then tighten your belts for you are in for a thin time.

In Central Africa, Britain is attempting to create a second South Africa. She is imposing a settler dominated Federation on the Africans of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. We call upon those nations whose consciences are clear to tell Britain that if she imagines that she has still got the power to play with our destiny and to dish out at will sorrow or happiness to the people of Africa, she had better look at herself again. We have argued, we have pleaded, we have endeavoured to negotiate with her on this issue but without avail. If persuasion, logic and negotiation are wasted on the petrifying mind of Britain, then she will have to be woken up from her coma of petrifaction and made to respect her own democratic pledges by some other means.

To Welensky, the so-called Prime Minister of the so-called Central African Federation, I want to say : You are pitted against a generation of Africans who neither take "No" for an answer nor accept political defeat. The death warrant of your Federation has been signed and counter-signed. The death-knell tolls for it and we shall not rest until we have obtained its burial certificate. You are well advised to stop digging the grave of Europeans in Central Africa before they catch you at it. For it is dawning more and more on them and other Europeans who have made up their minds to make Africa their home that their security lies in winning the goodwill of Africans and in accepting the inevitability of majority rule and that their greatest enemies are people, like you, who would have them hold the opposite view. Your number is up and the game is over. Not even the rarest of luck will make it possible for you and men of your stamp to get away with it much longer.

In East Africa, Jomo Kenyatta, after seven long years of imprisonment, is still tethered, testifying to naked sadism—

the crimson thread in colonial history. Britain has lost her conscience and is in danger of losing her heart as well over the Kenyatta issue. For how long will the whims of British politicians continue to incarcerate Kenyatta ? Jail or no jail, restriction or no restriction, however, Kenyatta remains the Darling of Africa. He is irreplaceable and we are accepting no cheap substitute. He will yet come out and rule his jailers. He will yet come out and show imperialists that few things are as potent as the human machine powered by genuine grievances. He will yet come out and bequeath unto us the legacy of his wisdom. Woe unto him who wishes him ill!

In the Congo Republic the legitimate government of the country headed by Lumumba has been ousted by an armed scoundrel while United Nations troops watched on. At the southern tip of the country, Moise Tshombe, a veteran imperialist lackey and a distinguished political body, challenges the territorial integrity of the Republic. United Nations troops have confounded the confusion by refusing to recognise *in fact* the sovereignty of the Congo. Mobutu and Tshombe have committed treason to both God and man. But United Nations troops are also guilty of having committed (we are not sure whether by accident or by design) grave mistakes. The United Nations itself has had ample time in which to bring the situation under control and consequently redeem its own prestige which has suffered dangerously. But it has proved singularly ineffectual. This is not a matter which African nationalists can view with academic composure; it is a live issue which gets our blood racing. We call upon independent African States to form a Military High Command which should march into the Congo, release Lumumba, disarm and disband Mobutu's marauders, reinstate the legitimate government and allow normal parliamentary activities to resume. Only when that is done can we afford to indulge in the gentle art of diplomatic moralisation and philosophisation on an issue that hardly lends itself to such a treatment.

At the dome of Africa, Algeria still fries in de Gaulle's crucible. We all know the spine-chilling story of Algeria's suffering. So I will not subject you again to the agony of

listening to it. But I would like to say this to Charles de Gaulle : If it is capitulation you expect from Abbas and his men, you have another guess to make. The war will go on because you have demonstrated that you want "a give in" not "give and take". The nationalist army can take it. It has hit the bottom already. Abbas and his men are ready to negotiate provided you do not come to them as a senile bully. The Algerian issue made you President but it may also unmake you. Unless you can stop dithering and grant self-determination to the Algerians in the minimum of time and thus put a halt to the deterioration of a highly explosive situation, the day is fast approaching when capricious France may wish to chant *Sic Semper Tyrannis** over you.

Such are the pangs through which Africa is going at present. They are at once the death pangs of an Imperialist Order and the birth pains of a Nationalist Order. We are on the threshold of a New Era. The African giant has lifted his head and trunk and the chains of bondage are snapping violently. Before long he will be standing up majestically—exhibiting the African personality, warning neo-colonialists, admonishing war mongers, maintaining the balance between the East and the West, and proclaiming Africa's message to a weary world.

We wish you rousing success in your endeavour to establish "a socialistic pattern of society". You have blazed the trail. We are following behind.

Hindustan Zindabad!
Mayibuye Africa!
Jai Hind!
Kwacha!

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*"Thus Ever To Tyrants!"

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